In recent years, scholars have drawn attention to the myriad ways in which the lines between criminal enforcement and immigration control have blurred in law and public discourse.1 This Essay analyzes this convergence in the context of immigration detention. For decades, observers have analyzed a wide range of detention-related concerns,2 including mandatory custody,3 coercion and other due process violations,4 inadequate access to counsel,5 prolonged and indefinite custody,6 inadequate conditions of confinement,7 and violations of international law.8 With the number of detainees skyrocketing since the 1990s—owing to expansion of the categories of noncitizens subject to removal proceedings and custody and the resources dedicated to enforcement9—these concerns have rapidly proliferated.10
For many noncitizens, detention now represents a deprivation as severe as removal itself.11 Some commentators even resist the very term "detention" as misplaced, masking circumstances approximating criminal "incarceration" or "imprisonment."12 If convergence more generally has given rise to a system of crimmigration law, as observers maintain,13 then perhaps excessive immigration detention practices have evolved into a quasi-punitive system of immcarceration.
A recent report by Dora Schriro, a senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official, gives official imprimatur to crucial aspects of this picture, acknowledging explicitly that most detainees are held—systematically and unnecessarily—under circumstances inappropriate for immigration detention's noncriminal purposes.14 The acknowledgment has constitutional significance. To facilitate removal—long understood to be a civil sanction, not criminal punishment15—detention and other forms of custody are constitutionally permissible to prevent individuals from fleeing or endangering public safety.16 However, freedom from physical restraint "lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects,"17 and if the circumstances of detention become excessive in relation to these noncriminal purposes, then detention may be improperly punitive and therefore unconstitutional.18
In response, the Obama Administration has pledged reforms to reconstruct this regime as a "truly civil detention system."19 This Essay considers the possibilities and limits of these proposals, situating detention within the broader convergence of immigration control and criminal enforcement. Part I discusses the evolution of detention policies and practices and some ways in which they have become excessive. Part II analyzes the government's reform proposals, which target excessive conditions of confinement but leave other excessive practices intact. Part III situates detention within the broader context of the government's expansion of immigration enforcement. Notwithstanding the proposed reforms, the expansion of enforcement means that DHS will continue to detain noncitizens, in the words of a senior official, "on a grand scale"—which will significantly constrain its ability to dismantle the more quasi-punitive features of the detention regime.20 While excessive detention conditions may well be tempered for many individuals, large-scale immcarceration seems here to stay for the foreseeable future.
I. Constructing a Quasi-Punitive Detention Regime
A. The Expansion of Immigration Detention
The growth in immigration detention in recent years has been remarkable. In 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in detention on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000 individuals by 2001 and 33,000 by 2008. Over the same period, the overall number of individuals detained each year has swelled from approximately 81,000 to approximately 380,000.21 Almost half of all removal proceedings now involve detainees, up from one-third of proceedings as recently as 2004.22 Federal officials also induce the short-term detention of thousands of noncitizens for immigration purposes by lodging detainers requesting state and local officials to hold noncitizens in their custody until immigration officials can apprehend them.23
This growth has been fueled by enforcement policies that subject ever—larger categories of individuals to removal charges and custody, in many cases without the individualized bond hearings to which individuals ordinarily are entitled.24 First, individuals alleged to be removable on many criminal grounds—which now include a sweeping array of offenses, both serious and minor, and have become the government's highest interior enforcement objective25—statutorily must be "take[n] into [immigration] custody . . . when the alien is released" from criminal custody, and the government interprets this provision to preclude release from detention except under narrowly defined circumstances.26 Second, many noncitizens arriving in the United States, including returning permanent residents and asylum-seekers with a "credible fear" of persecution, must be detained if charged as inadmissible. Although these individuals may be released under the parole authority of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), immigration judges are precluded from independently reviewing ICE's parole and custody determinations.27 Third, many individuals with final administrative removal orders may be detained, at ICE's discretion and without immigration judge review, for extended periods while judicial review is pending or ICE is attempting to effectuate removal,28 although detention may not extend beyond a period "reasonably necessary to secure removal."29
Without distinguishing among these categories, the Schriro Report states that two-thirds of detainees are subject to "mandatory detention."30 At the same time, the number of detainees without any criminal conviction—who may not be subject to mandatory custody—doubled between 2005 and 2009.31 Officials spend $1.7 billion annually to run "the largest detention system in the country," a sprawling network of over 500 facilities nationwide.32 Approximately seventy percent of detainees are held in jails under ad hoc agreements, up from approximately twenty-five percent fifteen years ago.33
B. Detention's Excessiveness
Plainly, detention imposes serious hardships by its nature, depriving individuals of the ability to work and earn income, attend school, and maintain relationships.34 The resulting economic, emotional, and psychological harms are visited upon not just detainees, but also their family members, who may be U.S. citizens or legal residents and may include children or other dependents.35 With limited access to attorneys, witnesses, and sources of evidence, detainees—including U.S. citizens who are improperly detained36—face more barriers than their nondetained counterparts in presenting effective defenses against removal.37 Such hardships induce many detainees to acquiesce to removal simply to obtain release from custody—even if they have valid claims to remain in the United States, including claims to asylum or other discretionary relief.
These deprivations have been exacerbated by a range of detention-related policies and practices, as several examples illustrate. First, detention has been worsened by inadequate conditions of confinement—particularly with ICE's expanded use of county jails, whose conditions long have been "excoriat[ed]" as the "worst blight in American corrections."38 Overcrowding and lack of adequate telephone access, visitation hours, ventilation, food, clean quarters, and functioning showers and toilets have long been documented, and verbal and physical abuse have also been common.39 Inadequate health care has been a particularly serious problem.40 Over 100 detainees have died in custody since 2003, often due to neglect of their health needs.41 Conditions also have been severe for many detainees, who are frequently commingled with and subjected to the same treatment as criminal suspects and offenders; observers have frequently documented excessive use of physical restraints.42
Second, many detainees endure due process violations and hardships arising from routine transfers to facilities far from where most detainees reside. Transfers have multiplied with ICE's expansion of its detainee population and network of facilities: Because of shortages of detention space in California and the Northeast, ICE transfers detainees to far-flung locations "where there are surplus beds."43 From 2003 to 2007, the number of transfers more than doubled.44 Transfers exacerbate the problems that invariably arise in detention, disrupting detainees' ability to present effective arguments for release and against removal by interfering with attorney-client relationships, delaying and complicating proceedings, and even changing the applicable substantive law.45 In many instances, attorneys and family members have been unable to locate detainees for extended periods.46
Third, existing policies and practices almost certainly have caused overdetention: detention of individuals who pose no actual flight risk or danger to public safety or are held under overly restrictive circumstances. As custody, bond, and parole decisions increasingly have come to rest on broadly defined categories—for example, an individual's prior conviction47 or status as an asylum-seeker arriving by boat from Haiti48—rather than individualized determinations of flight risk or dangerousness, the number of detainees presenting no such risks has likely increased, although the precise extent is difficult to ascertain.49 Variations on overdetention result from regulations automatically staying immigration judges' custody and bond decisions pending administrative appeal,50 bonds that are routinely set too high for detainees to pay,51 and custody of individuals under excessively severe restraints.52
Finally, for many individuals, detention lasts for prolonged or indefinite periods of time. Although adjudicators expedite proceedings involving detainees, neither the Sixth Amendment nor any statutory speedy trial guarantee applies to immigration proceedings.53 With agency adjudicators and federal courts plagued with "staggering" immigration caseloads and insufficient resources, and with transfers causing additional delays, thousands of noncitizens have languished in detention for months and even years.54 Approximately five percent of detainees—close to 19,000 individuals each year—are held for more than four months, and approximately 2,100 individuals are held for more than one year.55 In many cases, detention has lasted much longer.56
The result for many noncitizens is a pattern of excessiveness that spans the entire detention process—from who is being detained in the first place and on what basis, to the severity of confinement, to the ultimate effect on removal proceedings. Immigration detention has embraced the "aesthetic" and "technique" of incarceration, evolving for many detainees into a quasi-punitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custody's permissible purposes.57
*Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law. Thanks to Chris Nugent, Alison Parker, Judy Rabinovitz, Jayashri Srikantiah, and Juliet Stumpf for helpful exchanges and comments on earlier drafts.
1 See, e.g., Brookings Inst. & Univ. of S. Cal. Annenberg Sch. for Commc'n, Democracy in the Age of New Media: A Report on the Media and the Immigration Debate 12, 23–27 (2008) (analyzing and concluding media coverage of immigration since 1980 has "focused overwhelmingly" on criminality and other forms of illegality); Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 135, 135–36 (2009) (discussing scholarship on convergence of criminal justice and immigration control regimes); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 469, 472, 500–10 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, New Path] (arguing immigration law has "absorb[ed] the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities" of criminal law enforcement); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 376 (2006) (arguing line between immigration law and criminal law "has grown indistinct").
2 E.g., Paul W. Schmidt, Detention of Aliens, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 305, 306 (1987).
3 E.g., Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996 Immigration Act: An Exercise in Overkill, 75 Interpreter Releases 1433, 1433 (1998).
4 E.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
5 E.g., Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647 (1997) [hereinafter Taylor, Promoting].
6 E.g., Arthur C. Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 353, 364–65 (1986); Legomsky, New Path, supra note 1, at 489–92.
7 E.g., Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1087, 1111–27 (1995) [hereinafter Taylor, Challenging Conditions].
8 E.g., Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 147, 154–64 (2008).
9 See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1137, 1149–68 (2008) (discussing expansion of interior enforcement); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1936, 1938–43 (2000) (discussing expansion of deportability grounds).
10 Between 2007 and 2009 alone, at least twenty-six reports documented detention-related concerns. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, Summaries of Recent Reports on Immigration Detention 2007–2009 (2010), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/DetentionReportsSummaries2007-2009.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing twenty-six such reports). For representative examples, see, e.g., Constitution Project, Recommendations for Reforming Our Immigration Detention System and Promoting Access to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/359.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Far Away: The Transfer of Immigrants to Remote Detention Centers in the United States (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/02/locked-far-away-0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 541 (2009).
11 See Mary E. Kramer, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity 123 (3d ed. 2008) ("In the vast majority of cases, the one consequence an individual client fears more than any other-usually more so than removal itself-is detention . . . .").
12 See, e.g., Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons 16–17 (2004) ("Legalistic distinctions aside, someone who is detained or imprisoned is a prisoner."); Subhash Kateel & Aarti Shahani, Families for Freedom Against Deportation and Delegalization, in Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today 258, 264 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2008) (arguing detainees "are treated no differently than prisoners"); Taylor, Challenging Conditions, supra note 7, at 1113 & n.126 (discussing comparisons between detention and criminal imprisonment).
13 E.g., Stumpf, supra note 1, at 376.
14 Dora Schriro, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 10, 15 (2009). Schriro has since left DHS.
15 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728–30 (1893) (observing that deportation proceedings have "all the elements of a civil case" and are "in no proper sense a trial or sentence for a crime or offense").
16 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1006–07 (2002).
17 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 590.
18 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) ("Due process requires that a pretrial [criminal] detainee not be punished.").
19 Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Overhaul Detention Policy for Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2009, at A1.
20 John T. Morton, Assistant Sec'y of Homeland Sec. for Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Speech Before Migration Policy Institute (Jan. 25, 2010), at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291598–1.
21 Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Migration Policy Inst., Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities? 6–7 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2009.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (numbers from 2001 and 2008); Taylor, Challenging Conditions, supra note 7, at 1107 (numbers from 1994).
22 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book, at O1 fig.23 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23 Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 164, 173–82 (2008); Fact Sheet, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Law Enforcement Support Center (Nov. 19, 2008), at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/lesc.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006) (authorizing release on bond); U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigration Statistics, 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 95 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting increase in individuals removed from United States from 23,000 in 1985 to over 358,000 in 2008).
25 See, e.g., Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1155–57 (discussing congressional expansion of grounds of deportability).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).
27 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A); see also id. § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing humanitarian parole).
28 Id. § 1231(a)(2).
29 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001) (defining six months as presumptively reasonable); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (extending Zadvydas to inadmissible noncitizens); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13–241.14 (2009) (detailing procedures governing post-final order custody review).
30 Schriro, supra note 14, at 6.
31 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Detention of Criminal Aliens: What Has Congress Bought? (2010), at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Kerwin & Lin, supra note 21, at 22 (finding fifty-eight percent of detainees have no criminal record).
32 Schriro, supra note 14, at 6; Nat'l Immigration Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention 1 (2009), at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
33 Schriro, supra note 14, at 10, 15; Taylor, Challenging Conditions, supra note 7, at 1106. Eleven percent of detainees are held in government owned but privately operated facilities, while sixteen percent are held in privately owned and operated facilities. Schriro, supra note 14, at 15.
34 E.g., Constitution Project, supra note 10, at 14.
35 E.g., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Severing a Lifeline: The Neglect of Citizen Children in America's Immigration Enforcement Policy 48–57 (2009), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyProBono_SeveringLifeline_web.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
36 E.g., Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell, Citizens Snared in the Net, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 2009, at A1.
37 E.g., Taylor, Promoting, supra note 5, at 1651–52; cf. John S. Goldkamp, Questioning the Practice of Pretrial Detention: Some Empirical Evidence From Philadelphia, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1556, 1557 (1983) (noting that defendants who are detained before trial are "impaired [in] their ability to prepare an adequate defense").
38 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1686 n.434 (2003) (quoting criminologist). Jails tend to be more dangerous and "inherently more chaotic" than prisons; because of rapid turnover, "classification of jail inmates is more haphazard, jail routines are less regular, jail time is more idle, and jail inmates are more likely to be in some kind of crisis." Id. at 1686–87 & n.434.
39 E.g., Amnesty Int'l, Jailed Without Justice: Immigration Detention in the USA 29–43 (2009); Nat'l Immigration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild et al., Petition for Rulemaking to Promulgate Regulations Governing Detention Standards for Immigration Detainees 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/detention%20petition%20for%20rulemaking%20-%207–09.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
40 See generally Fla. Immigrant Advocacy Ctr., Dying for Decent Care: Bad Medicine in Immigration Custody (2009), available at http://www.fiacfla.org/reports/DyingForDecentCare.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting "urgent crisis in medical care for ICE detainees").
41 Nina Bernstein, Officials Obscured Details of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Bernstein, Officials Obscured Details]; see also All Things Considered: The Death of Richard Rust (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 5, 2005), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5022866 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing death of Richard Rust from heart attack while in immigration custody).
42 See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 39, at 37–39 (discussing "inappropriate and excessive use of restraints"); Constitution Project, supra note 10, at 15 (noting that many detainees are "held in prison-like conditions" with pretrial criminal suspects and convicted offenders). Most facilities-accounting for half of all detainees-commingle immigration detainees with local criminal populations. Schriro, supra note 14, at 10.
43 Schriro, supra note 14, at 6–9; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 21 ("ICE's haphazard system of placing detainees . . . helps to explain why its transfer system is equally haphazard."); All Things Considered: Immigration Transfers Add to System's Problems (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 11, 2009), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100597565 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing reasons for lack of detention space in Northeast).
44 Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 29–30.
45 See id. at 58–61, 66–71 (detailing difficulties in representation of detainees presented by transfer system). In practice, a detainee's ability to return venue to pre-transfer locations is limited. Id. at 61–65.
46 See id. at 24, 79–83 ("[D]etainees can literally be ‘lost' from their attorneys and family members for days or even weeks after a transfer."); Kerwin & Lin, supra note 21, at 10–11 (discussing unreliability of detainee location procedures).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).
48 See In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (Att'y Gen. 2003) (denying parole to Haitian asylum-seeker).
49 See Am. Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases ES-25 (2010); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous By Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 149, 170 (2004) (discussing increase in "no-bond directives based on categorical presumptions").
50 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (2009); see also Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding predecessor provision unconstitutional).
51 Nationwide, the average bond is almost $6,000. While immigration judges may release noncitizens on recognizance, many are reluctant and uncertain about their authority to do so. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 39, at 17–18; cf. All Things Considered: Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed with Inmates (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 21, 2010), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725771 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting two-thirds of criminal pretrial detainees are nonviolent offenders who cannot afford bail).
52 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 39, at 37–39 (discussing "inappropriate and excessive use of restraints").
53 See, e.g., Argiz v. U.S. Immigration, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding neither Sixth Amendment, Speedy Trial Act, nor Interstate Agreement on Detainers guarantees speedy deportation hearing).
54 Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 58–61 (detailing ways in which transfers delay bond hearings); Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow (2009), at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing growing backlog of immigration cases); see Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 595, 598-611 (2009) (discussing large caseloads, backlogs, and other weaknesses in immigration adjudication); Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 855 (discussing increases in immigration caseloads before U.S. courts of appeals).
55 Kerwin & Lin, supra note 21, at 16–20; Schriro, supra note 14, at 6.
56 E.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2008) (more than seven years); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (almost five years); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (almost three years); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 2003) (500 days).
57 Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 237, 237–39 (2009).
Preferred Citation: Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42 (2010), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf.
Part II available at: http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/rethinking-immigration-detention-part-ii
